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THE RESERVED OR SEPARATE GATE DOCTRINE:
HAS IT COME FULL CIRCLE?
MARTIN L. GARDEN*
The "Reserved" or "Separate" Gate Doctrine received its impetus from
an attempt by the National Labor Relations Board and the courts to in-
sulate secondary or neutral employers and their employees from becoming
enmeshed in a dispute between another employer and a labor organization.
Insulation of neutrals as provided for under the Taft-Hartley Act' as
amended is neither new nor novel, but the application thereunder has
created new problems. Section 8(b) (4) makes it an unfair labor practice
for a union
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce
to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on
any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any ser-
vices; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case
an object thereof is- .
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other pro-
ducer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person... Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B)
shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any
primary strike or primary picketing.'
The difficulty with reading these provisions literally is that any picketing
of the premises of an employer necessarily has a disruptive effect on the
relations between the employer and his suppliers or customers. "A strike,
by its very nature, inconveniences those who customarily do business with
the struck employer.".3 "The cases recognize the very practical fact that,
intended or not, sought for or not, aimed for or not, employees of neutral
*Field Attorney, 14th Region, National Labor Relations Board. The National Labor
Relations Board, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publica-
tion by any of its employees. The views expressed in this article are the personal views
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board or its staff.
1. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68
(1958).
2. These provisions were put in their present form by the Labor Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 704(a), 73 Stat. 542 (1959),
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. IV 1963).
3. Oil Workers Union (Pure Oil Co.), 84 N.L.R.B. 315, 318 (1949).
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employers do take action sympathetic with strikers and do put pressure on
their own employers."'
I. THE GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF THE DISPUTE CASES
The Board, in order to avoid defeating the Congressional intent of 8(b)
(4), did not literally apply the statutory language to the cases that came
before it, but rather applied a primary-secondary distinction and ruled that
all picketing at the premises of the primary employer was immune from the
prohibition of 8(b) (4) (A) of the statute. In United Electrical Workers
(Ryan Constr. Corp.),5 the employer, Bucyrus, in order to insulate the
employees of Ryan Construction Corporation from the dispute with the
Union, established a separate gate for Ryan employees at the site of a con-
struction project Ryan was performing for Bucyrus. The Union picketed
the entire premises, and the Board ruled that the activity was "primary
picketing" and thus non-violative of Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the act. The
Board stated that the provision
was intended only to outlaw certain secondary boycotts, whereby
unions sought to enlarge the economic battleground beyond the prem-
ises of the primary employer. When picketing is wholly at the premises
of the employer with whom the union is engaged in a labor dispute, it
cannot be called "secondary" even though, as is virtually always the
case, an object of the picketing is to dissuade all persons from enter-
ing such premises for business reasons.'
In the early cases that involved picketing on neutral premises the Board
evolved the "situs of the dispute" theory which imposed limitations upon a
union's right to picket at the situs of a dispute located on neutral premises.
Thus, in Sailor's Union (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 7 the Board stated:
In the kind of situation that exists in this case, we believe that picket-
ing of the premises of a secondary employer is primary if it meets the
following conditions: (a)The picketing is strictly limited to times
when the situs of dispute is located on the secondary employer's
premises; (b) at the time of the picketing the primary employer is en-
gaged in its normal business at the situs; (c) the picketing is limited
to places reasonably close to the location of the situs; and (d) the
picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the primary em-
ployer.8
In NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co.,9 members of the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters who were not employees of Kaplan Rice
4. Seafarers Union v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 585, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
5. 85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949).
6. Id. at 418 (Footnote omitted.)
7. 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).
8. Id. at 549. (Footnotes omitted.)
9. 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
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Mills picketed the premises of Kaplan and requested the driver of the truck
of a neutral customer to refrain from entering the premises to pick up an
order of goods. Citing Oil Workers Uunion (Pure Oil Co.)," the Board
had dismissed the complaint on the ground that the union's activities were
merely primary picketing of the Kaplan Mills and were carried out in the
immediate vicinity of the mill. The Supreme Court sustained the Board's
dismisal of the complaint but stated:
The limitation of the complaint to an incident in the geographically
restricted area near the mill is significant, although not necessarily con-
clusive. The picketing was directed at the Kaplan employees and at
their employer in a manner traditional in labor disputes. Clearly, that,
in itself, was not proscribed by § 8(b) (4). Insofar as the union's
efforts were directed beyond that and toward the employees of anyone
other than Kaplan, there is no suggestion that the union sought con-
certed conduct by such other employees. . . . A union's inducements
or encouragements reaching individual employees of neutral employers
only as they happen to approach the picketed place of business generally
are not aimed at concerted, as distinguished from individual, conduct
by such employees. Generally, therefore, such actions do not come
within the prosciption of 8(b) (4), and they do not here."x
The word "concerted" was removed by the 1959 Landrum-Griffin
Amendment and, thus, the specific holding of International Rice Milling
is no longer applicable; but the Court's rationale set the stage for a dif-
ferent approach to the construction of 8(b) (4).
II. THE "OBJECT OF THE PICKETING" CASES
Instead of relying primarily on the geographic area of the dispute, the
Court began emphasizing the object of the picketing.12 It is generally true
that a union hopes that all persons will honor its picket line even if it does
not intend to enmesh neutral employees in its dispute with an employer,
but the Board and courts were careful to point out that harm to neutrals
could be justified if it occurred as an incidental effect of the union's primary
dispute with an employer'
10. 84 N.L.R.B. 315 (1949). The Board in that case stated:
[We conclude that the section does not outlaw any of the primary means which
unions traditionally use to press their demands on employers. In this case the
Union was making certain lawful demands on Standard Oil. It was pressing
these demands, in part, by picketing the Standard Oil Dock. As that picketing
was confined to the immediate vicinity of Standard Oil premises we find that it
constituted permissive primary action. Id. at 318-19. (Emphasis added).
11. 341 U.S. at 671.
12. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 685 (1951);
International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 699 (1951); Local
74, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 707, 708, 713 (1951).
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In Brewery Drivers (Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc.)"
the union, after calling a strike against Washington Coca Cola, picketed
the plant premises and the company's delivery trucks as they made their
rounds to customers' premises. The Board distinguished the Moore Dry
Dock criterion by finding that in the instant case there was a permanent
establishment at which the union could adequately picket, while in Moore
Dry Dock the employer had no permanent place of business." This ra-
tionale added a so-called "fifth condition" to those enumerated in Moore
Dry Dock.'" The rationale provided sufficient justification to permit the
union to picket the primary employer at the location of a transient work
situs, but where the employer had a fixed place of business in the area of
the dispute, at which its employees could be reached by the union, extension
of the picketing to the primary's job situs would be prohibited.
The Washington Coca Cola doctrine was extended to cases threatening
involvement of neutral employers and their employees. In Retail Fruit and
Vegetable Clerks Union (Crystal Palace Market), the employer with
whom the union was involved in a dispute owned a large market hall in
which he operated several stands and leased the remaining stands to neutral
third parties. When a strike was called against the primary employer, the
union picketed at several general entrances to the market hall. The Board
held the picketing violative of 8 (b) (4), stating: "In developing and apply-
ing these standards, the controlling consideration has been to require that
the picketing be so conducted as to minimize its impact on neutral employees
insofar as this can be done without substantial impairment of the effective-
ness of the picketing in reaching the primary employees.""8
Thus, it became clear that the Board and courts were moving to an in-
terpretation of 8(b) (4) (B) that would require a finding that an object of
the picketing was illegal."
13. See NLRB v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, 191 F.2d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1951).
14. 107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953).
15. Id. at 303.
16. 92. N.L.R.B. at 549.
17. 116 N.L.R.B. 856 (1956).
18. Id. at 859.
19. However, the Board in International Bhd. of Electrical Workers (Plauche Electric,
Inc.), 135 N.L.R.B. 250 (1962), by refusing to follow Washington Coca Cola, indicated
that it will avoid, if possible, the crystallization of rules-of-thumb to guide the inquiry
into objectives. "We shall not automatically find unlawful all picketing at the site where
the employees of the primary employer spend practically their entire working day
simply because, as in this case, they may report for a few minutes at the beginning and
end of each day to the regular place of business of the primary employer." Id. at 253.
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In Atomic Projects Workers,2" approximately twelve firms had prime
contracts with the Atomic Energy Commission for construction work at the
Sandia Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The respondent unions had a
dispute with the Sandia Corporation, which had a contract with the AEC,
and in furtherance of their dispute, the unions picketed all the entrances to
the base, including one which had been set apart for the exclusive use of
employees of contractors. Food, beverage, and laundry trucks entered the
base, usually by the main gate. The twelve contractors were to construct a
gymnasium, a chapel, cafeteria, warehouse, and to perform work on an
office and lab, while the Sandia Corporation operated the AEC steam plant
which supplied the whole base. Written instructions were received by the
guards at the reserved gate, to the effect that any contractors who were
employed with, or supplied the base, would be permitted entrance through
the gate, excluding employees of the Sandia Corporation with whom the
union had the dispute. The Board affirmed the Trial Examiner's decision
that an object of the union's picketing at the reserved gate was to induce em-
ployees of neutrals to cease work. There was no indication from the
published decision as to what other work if any, was performed by the
Sandia Corporation, or whether the work of the contractors was related to
the work of the Sandia Corporation. Apparently, the respondent unions did
not argue that the services performed by the neutrals aided the primary em-
ployer so as to defend their picketing on an "ally doctrine."
It now seemed clear that the gravamen of any violation of 8(b) (4) (B)
was that the object of the complained-of conduct, i.e., the objective of the
picketing had to be one proscribed by the act, and that the proscribed ob-
ject had to be some object other than legitimate activity which had, in this
area of discussion, been continually defined in such cases as Crystal Palace
Market as reaching the primary employees."' As a practical matter, neutral
employees might incidentally notice picketing at a main gate located at a
distance from the gate reserved for their use. This could have an effect
similar to picketing the reserved gate, but reserved gate picketing reflected
an object to influence only the neutrals, which object was felt to have been
proscribed by the act.
In Local 671, International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB,2"
the ingress to the plant of employer General Electric was limited to five
20. 120 N.L.R.B. 400 (1958), affd sub nom. Office Employees Union v. NLRB,
262 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
21. Cf. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 688-90
(1951).
22. 278 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd and remanded 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
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gates. The Respondent union called a strike because of twenty-four un-
settled grievances with G.E., and picketing occurred at all five gates.
Several years prior to the strike G.E. had issued written instructions to its
guards limiting one gate to independent contractors and their employees,
to minimize the possibility of picketing by various labor organizations due
to jurisdictional strikes among the craft union employees which had oc-
curred at the plant over a period of years. About six months prior to the
strike, a sign had been posted at the reserved gate, which read: "Gate 3-A
For employees Of contractors only G.E. employees use Other gates." The
guards strictly enforced the rule; however, the picketing was effective, and
most of the independent contractors' employees refused to cross the picket
line at all the gates. The Trial Examiner held the picketing did not
violate 8(b) (4) (A) because traditional primary strike activity extends to
peaceful solicitation of neutrals to refrain from bringing materials or goods
into the struck plant, and from contributing to production and maintenance
by working in the struck plant, or suppling materials for use by neutral em-
ployees. 8 The Trial Examiner also concluded that there was no invalid
secondary activity because the union did not induce or encourage em-
ployees of neutrals to cease work at any place other than the premises of
the primary employer.2" In reaching his decision, the Trial Examiner in-
quired into the nature of G.E.'s contracts with its independent contractors
at the time of the strike, indicating a concern over whether the contractors'
operations were "related to the production of finished products or the
maintenance of the plant."' The Board reversed the Trial Examiner and
held that the union's object was to enmesh employees of neutrals in its dis-
pute with the company.2
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia enforced 7 the
Board's order which was based on a finding that an object of the picketing
was to encourage neutral employees to engage in a refusal to perform ser-
vices so that their employers would cease doing business with G.E. The
court did not discuss the "related work" theory of the Trial Examiner nor
mention the applicability of the type of work being performed by the
neutrals. The Board continued to follow the "object of the picketing"
23. International Union of Electrical Workers (General Electric Co. ), 123 N.L.R.B.
1547, 1563 (1959).
24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 1555.
26. Id. at 1551.
27. Local 671, International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 282
(D.C. Cir. 1960).
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theory, and in Local 36, International Chemical Workers Union (Virginia-
Carolina Chemical Corp.),28 upheld the Trial Examiner's finding that the
union's picketing of a separate gate reserved for use by independent con-
tractors violated 8(b) (4) (A). The Board agreed with the Trial Examiner
that the District of Columbia holding in the General Electric case, was in-
consistent with the Ryan Construction Corp. case, I and overruled the
earlier case "to the extent that it is inconsistent with the General Elecric
case.""0 The result seemingly destroyed, for the time being, all vestiges of
the earlier principle that picketing at the primary's place of business was
valid and constituted protected activity. However, a subsequent decision by
the Second Circuit, coupled with the 1961 reversal by the Supreme Court of
the General Electric case, was destined to cast new light on the matter.
III. "RELATED WoRK," DOCTRINE
In United Steelworkers v. NLRB,3' the Phelps-Dodge Co. decided to con-
struct a new gas handling and dust collecting system to conform to the
requirements specified by the New York City Board of Air Pollution Con-
trol, and consequently hired independent contractors to perform the work.
At first, Phelp's employees and the employees of the independent contrac-
tors entered the premises through the same gate, but approximately one
week prior to the picketing, the Company opened a contractors' gate 1200
feet from the gate formerly used and placed a sign thereon reading, "Con-
tractors Only." When the strike began, the contractors' employees were told
to use the contractors' gate. The Union picketed that gate, and all con-
struction stopped. The reasoning of the court in affirming the Board's
finding" that the act had been violated, was that picketing of the contrac-
tors' gate was not necessary to publicize the strike because the main gate
could be picketed where the Company's employees and deliverymen entered
the premises.' Secondly, the work performed by the independent contrac-
tors' employees was not the work of an "ally" hired to do the everyday
business of the struck employer in an effort to preserve its good will and
28. 126 N.L.R.B. 905 (1960). One of the contractors installed a fume-removal and
scrubber system. Over a period of time, Virginia-Carolina had periodically contracted
out various maintenance and renovation work which did not operate to withdraw work
or employment from their own maintenance staff. It involved functions beyond or in
addition to those normally performed by Virginia's staff. Id. at 906.
29. 85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949).
30. Local 36, International Chemical Workers Union (Virginia-Carolina Chemical
Corp.), 126 N.L.R.B. 905, 906 (1960).
31. 289 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1961).
32. United Steelworkers (Phelps-Dodge Refining Corp.), 126 N.L.R.B. 1367 (1960).
33. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 591, 594 (2d Cir. 1961).
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profits." Thirdly, the kind of work engaged in was not of a kind that re-
quired the closing-down or curtailing of normal operations so that the
Company could mitigate the economic effect of the strike. Proof of this
was found in the fact that the contractors' work has been in progress several
weeks prior to the commencement of the strike. 5
As can be seen, the court in United Steelworkers listed these criteria in
the context of the "ally" doctrine which states that a contractor will not be
permitted to work free from picketing if his employees are performing the
everyday business of the struck employer, so as to maintain the good will
of the struck employer and perhaps even his profits. There was nothing in
the Board's decision to indicate that Phelps' normal operations were more
than the smelting and refining of copper ores and the sale and distribution
of copper products. There is also nothing in the Trial Examiner's Inter-
mediate Report to show what work Phelps' maintenance department per-
formed in relation to or in comparison with the work of subcontractors who
used a gate reserved exclusively for Phelp's contractors. In fact, there is no
indication that a maintenance department existed. The Second Circuit
specifically mentioned the work of the independent contractors without com-
paring it with the specific work of the striking employees. The work of
the independent contractors was mentioned only to show that it was not
the same type of work as performed by the primary's employees who were
obviously engaged in refining copper, and to show that they were not allies
of the primary."'
The Second Circuit, in enforcing the Board's order against the Union,
stated that "considering the location of the gate, the relationship between
Phelps-Dodge and the independent contractors, and the nature of the work
being performed by those contractors, we hold that the labor statute pro-
hibits such picketing even though it took place at the premises of the struck
employer."87 Thus, the stage was set for a determination by the Supreme
Court, which was forthcoming in its reversal of the General Electric case s3
The Court literally lifted the "related work" doctrine of United Steelworkers
and adopted the doctrine as its own, stating that: "the key to the problem
is found in the type of work that is being performed by those who use the
separate gate."8" The Supreme Court was interested in whether there was
34. Id. at 595.
35. Ibid. See note 42 infra.
36. Ibid.
37. Id. at 594.
38. Local 671, International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667
(1961).
39. Id. at 680. (Emphasis added.)
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a mixed use of the struck premises and remanded the case to the Board to
determine the instances of maintenance tasks, stating:
The legal path by which the Board and the Court of Appeals reached
their decisions did not take into account that if Gate 3-A was in fact
used by employees of independent contractors who performed con-
ventional maintenance work necessary to the normal operations of
General Electric, the use of the gate would have been a mingled one
outside the bar of § 8(b) (4) (A). In short, such mixed use of this por-
tion of the struck employer's premises would not bar picketing rights of
the striking employees. While the record shows some such mingled use,
it sheds no light on its extent. It may well turn out to be that the in-
stances of these maintenance tasks were so insubstantial as to be treated
by the Board as de minimis4
On remand,4' the Board found that G. E.'s employees had done non-
conveyor work identical or substantially similar to that scheduled to be
done by employees of the independent contractors on jobs whose contract
prices totaled approximately 14,750 dollars. The Board stated:
Since this work, which we find constitutes more than a de minimis
amount had previously been performed by GE employees, we find that
such work was part of GE's normal operations. It follows therefore
that this work, which was scheduled to be performed by independent
contractors utilizing gate 3-A, was necessarily related to GE's normal
operations. We accordingly find that the Supreme Court's "related
work" condition was not met and hence the Union's picketing at gate
3-A was primary. 2
The jobs included "the installation of shower rooms, repair of roads, con-
struction of a sound room, enlarging of the ventilating system for the re-
moval of welding fumes, concrete work in connection with an air-shelter
type of warehouse building, and the construction of a catwalk. '"3
40. Id. at 682.
41. Local 761, International Union of Electrical Workers (General Electric Co.),
138 N.L.R.B. 342 (1962).
42. Id. at 346. The Board acknowledged that the Supreme Court, in remand-
ing the case, had imposed a new condition to any finding that reserved-gate picketing was
not primary.
We find, ... that, by picketing gate 3-A, the Union did not violate former Sec-
tion 8(b) (4) (A). However, we reach this conclusion solely on the following
grounds. As noted, the Supreme Court ruled that reserved-gate picketing was
primary unless the work of the independent contractors using the gate met both
of these conditions: (1) the work ... must be unrelated to the normal operation
of the employer... ; and (2) the work.... if done when the plant was engaged
in regular operations, would not necessitate curtailing those operations. Accord-
ingly, if a portion of the work of the independent contractors using gate 3A
constituting more than a de minimis amount failed to meet either of these con-
ditions, the reserved-gate picketing was primary. Id. at 345.
43. Id. at 346. The Board further found that the work of the independent con-
tractors was related to G.E.'s normal operations, because their employees were scheduled
to work during the picketing, together with employees of independent contractors in the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The next significant Supreme Court case after the General Electric re-
mand was United Steelworkers v. NLRB." The Union had picketed a
separate entrance through which trains passed into the premises of Carrier
Corporation, the primary employer. The picketing was actually done on
property owned by the railroad. The captain of the pickets testified that the
purpose of the picketing was to cause the railroad to cease handling or
transporting Carrier products. The Trial Examiner" found a violation
of 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) of the act, but the Board reversed the Trial
Examiner and found that the services performed by the railroad for Car-
rier, i.e., the delivery of empty boxcars to Carrier and the transportation of
Carrier products, was clearly related to Carrier's normal operations."
Board member Rodgers dissented and treated the case the same as the Trial
Examiner, specifically stating that this was not a "reserved gate" situation
since the gate in question was located on the railroad's right-of-way.Y7 On
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Board was re-
versed and the Trial Examiner was upheld on the ground that the case
was one of picketing on the secondary employer's premises and that no de-
termination of the type of work need be made in such a situation 8 The
court reversed the Board's decision because the picketing at the railroad
gate was directed solely at the neutral railroad employees and could not be
regarded as incidental to what the court considered the only legitimate
union objective: publicizing the labor dispute to the employees involved
therein, i.e., those working for Carrier. The court did not believe that it
was necessary for respondent to publicize its dispute by directly emmeshing
the neutrals. The Supreme Court's holding in General Electric was dis-
tinguished on the ground that the gate in the Carrier case was located on
premises belonging to a neutral employer. 9 Chief Judge Lumbard of the
Second Circuit dissented and, because of the asserted conflict with the
General Electric case, and the importance of the problem to the National
Labor Policy, the Supreme Court granted certiorari."0
The Supreme Court posed the question as: "whether the activities of the
union, although literally within the definition of secondary activities con-
construction of a truck dock and in the construction of a mezzanine, the contract price
of which totaled $26,100.
44. 376 U.S. 492 (1964).
45. Local 5895, United Steelworkers (Carrier Corp.), 132 N.L.R.B. 127, 144 (1961).
46. Id. at 130.
47. Id. at 132.
48. Carrier Corp. v. NLRB, 311 F.2d 135, 148-49 (2d Cir. 1962).
49. Ibid.
50. 373 U.S. 908 (1963).
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tained in clauses (i) and (ii) of § 8(b) (4), are nevertheless within the
protected area of primary picketing carved out by Congress in the proviso
to subsection (B)."51
In the original General Electric decision, 2 Board member Fanning, con-
curring, insisted that the facts presented a common-situs problem since the
regular work of the contractor was continuously done on the primary
premises and hence the rules of the Moore Dry Dock case should be ap-
plied.5" The Union, on the other hand, argued that no picketing at the
primary premises should be considered a secondary activity. The Supreme
Court" rejected both the rationale of the Board and of the Union, and
found that the location of the picketing was not significant.
In United Steelworkers the Supreme Court stated:
It seems clear that the rejection of the Board's position in General
Electric leaves no room for the even narrower approach of the Court
of Appeals in this case, which is that the picketing at the site of a strike
could be directed at secondary employees only where incidental to
appeals to primary employees. Under this test, no picketing at gates
used only by employees of delivery men would be permitted, a result
expressly disapproved by the Court in General Electric.5
The Court further stated:
Picketing has traditionally been a major weapon to implement the
goals of a strike and has characteristically been aimed at all those ap-
proaching the situs whose mission is selling, delivering or otherwise
contributing to the operations which the strike is endeavoring to halt.
In light of this traditional goal of primary pressures we think Congress
intended to preserve the right to picket during a strike a gate re-
served for employees of neutral delivery men furnishing day-to-day ser-
vice essential to the plant's regular operations. 6
CONCLUSION
It seems that the court is attempting to return to the earlier decisions
defending picketing at the situs of the dispute as being primary although
neutrals are involved. The court has not overruled any of its decisions in
making this circular transition; rather, it has interpreted the reserved gate
51. 376 U.S. at 496.
52. International Union of Electrical Workers (General Electric Co.), 123 N.L.R.B.
1547 (1959). See text accompanying note 23 supra.
53. Id. at 1552-53.
54. Local 761, International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667
(1961).
55. 376 U.S. at 498.
56. Id. at 499. (Footnote omitted.)
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doctrine so as to reach the result of legitimizing primary picketing without
adverting to the many Board and court decisions which seek to limit picket-
ing that is found to be directed solely at neutral employers.
The broad language used by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers
may, however, effectively foreclose an employer's use of a reserved gate to
neutrals from his dispute. The Court discussed the right of a union to picket
a gate of neutral deliverymen furnishing day-to-day service, and in General
Electric, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that a ruling making it unlawful
to picket at a reserved gate "would not bar the Union from picketing at all
gates used by the employees, suppliers, and customers of the struck em-
ployer." '57 If the key to the problem is found in the type of work being
performed by those who use the separate gate, and if such work is in any
manner related to the employer's normal operations, whether it be day-to-
day service or construction of a conveyor belt, then picketing of a separate
gate will not be unlawful even if the sole object of the picketing is to en-
mesh neutrals in a primary's dispute.
Thus, the "reserved-gate" doctrine is now almost useless to an employer
because it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which an employer could
now successfully isolate his subcontractors from his dispute with a labor
organization unless the services performed by a neutral were completely
unrelated to the employer's normal operations.
The use of the word "related" seems unfortunate because, generically,
it might include any type of work that the employer normally performs, be
it a normal production process or maintenance work. As a practical matter,
an employer's subcontractors would necessarily perform work related to
the employer's normal operations. What are an employer's normal opera-
tions? Does it make any difference whether subcontractors are construct-
ing new buildings which will aid an employer's operation or merely per-
forming maintenance work that the employer's own maintenance depart-
ment has done in the past? These and many other unanswered questions
have arisen from the Court's interpretation of the "reserved gate" doctrine.
57. Local 761, International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667,
680 (1961).
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